Showing posts with label speciesism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label speciesism. Show all posts

Saturday, June 19, 2010

Carnism or Speciesism

On a LinkedIn discussion recently, I posted news about Melanie Joy's interview with ABC about her new book, Why do we love dogs and eat pigs and wear cows? in which she develops the concept of carnism.

One longstanding and highly-esteemed listmember asked whether this is carnism or speciesism?  The logician in both of us might ponder, is that question a disjunction or a conjuction?  In other words, asking "Is the problem EITHER speciesism or carnism?" is a question about a conjunction; the answer would be "yes" (the problem is either the first OR the second OR both).

Asking the question, should the problem be TERMED "carnism" or "speciesism" is different, and it's that question I address here.

If you're interviewing Melanie Joy on ABC, she's going to tell you it's 'carnism' (which is a belief that eating meat is 'natural' 'normal' and 'necessary' - as she outlines in her book).



If you're an older vegan of the Peter Singer variety, you'll probably term it speciesism because you think of how some folks artificially consider other types of life unworthy of moral consideration (or sufficient moral consideration, some say 'equal moral consideration').


I think the standard of 'equal moral consideration' is problematic in two ways:
it makes our moral consideration of animals the arbiter of whether or not we ought to be eating them, when ample social science work over the past TWO decades (and longer) PLUS our own 'naive' (often unsystematic and nonrigorous) observations (as laypersons) have shown that the majority of vegetarians AND vegans go vegetarian or vegan for health reasons (not what we ideologues would wish, for animal rights or philosophical reasons.


A stat I used to quote throughout the late 80s and 90s was that social science has consistently shown that the primary reasons claimed by vegetarianism for being vegetarian is health, with ONLY about one of six (1/6) citing overtly philosophical reasons (contrasted with emotional "I couldn't eat them" or medical or health "I felt better" or "the medical evidence is on the side of my being vegetarian" reasons).  The category 'philosophical reasons' included overtly religious reasons (which may have been ideologically nonspecific (e.g. "I was taught as an Adventist that vegetarianism is God's way for us to be" or "Jainism teaches respect for all life, so we are vegetarian from birth" or "my religion teaches vegetarianism").

Saturday, January 30, 2010

Not being sidetracked by particulars

The recent (Wednesday, January 27, 2010) death of 26-year-old Kansan Daniel Shaull in Portland, Oregon, who set himself afire downtown outside a fur store to protest the wanton and callous cruelty of the fur industry and of those who buy from fur stores and who engage in supporting the fur industry, has promoted much discussion on the Internet.

Man Sets Himself on Fire at Portland Fur Store
A man set himself on fire Wednesday outside Ungar Furs in Portland, Oregon. After dousing himself with gasoline, he attempted to enter the store, shouting “There are animals dying! Animals dying!” After police extinguished the flames, he was taken to Legacy Emanuel Hospital where he later died. The man was identified as 26-year-old Daniel Shaull from Kansas. Among the local activists I have spoken to, none are familiar with Shaull by name, nor recognized him as being a part of the active, long-running campaign against Ungar Furs. Yet the location and witness reports strongly indicate this man sacrificed himself to bring attention to the horrific treatment of animals on fur farms…..

http://thomaspainescorner.wordpress.com/2010/01/28/man-sets-himself-on-fire-at-portland-fur-store/

2. The Defendants have literally gotten away with murder…

The courts are no friend to underdogs. They are ostensibly objective, but ultimately, they exist to protect the “rights” of the rich and powerful to bully the rest of the world, including the poor, minorities, immigrants, the working class, and, last but not least, nonhuman sentients and those who fight for them. Grand juries, which are often witch hunts and sometimes violate their victims’ Constitutional rights by imprisoning them indefinitely without charging them with a crime, and stalking orders, which are becoming frequently employed tools of judicial over-reach and creative law enforcement, are the repressive measures of choice that the corporate-state is using to attempt to intimidate and shut-down legal, above-ground animal rights activists….
http://gahc.wordpress.com/2010/01/29/the-defendants-have-literally-gotten-away-with-murder/

Nuancing this sacrifice correctly is going to be a challenge to the AR movement, particularly activists in Portland because, even though Daniel may have wanted to the horrible things being done to animals (albeit rodents, we're often reminded), the attention has been on the burning of oneself.

Ethicists always focus; we focus on the (statistically-frequent) cruel interface between humans and nonhumans for whom some uses, often trivial and indefensible uses, have been invented.

We abolitionists don't separate defensible and indefensible human uses of others against their willful consent; many consequentialists do such a conceptual distinction.

Daniel, who may have said to others that he was going to 'do something' that day and had previously expressed that the (social) world is not as it should be (he has the world's religions and ethical philosophies backing him up there), still seems to have decided and acted on his own (and even his father commented in one interview that his son had never presented himself to his family as being an animal rights activist, though he had presented himself as being troubled about the state of the (social) "world" around us that was filled with so much wanton cruelty.

Whatever solutions we offer need to be adopted as sustainable solutions (such as abandoning ALL animal wearing - I suggest for items other than shoes, though we know quite easily that we can do without leather shoes) and recognizing the personhood of nonhumans - rather, acknowledging that what makes each of us humans persons is something that is not unique to us - individual corporeality, complex nervous systems that coordinate as individual self-aware selves capable of complex outlooks on the world and complex emotions regarding other persons, including persons of other species (demonstrated, WE think and many others think, too) in nonhumans widely.

However, the attention has been reassigned to Daniel's mental status, a mental status that IMHO remains fully capable of recognizing when something is dreadfully wrong with how one class of humans (from whom we expect moral accountability) treats another class of beings (who are structurally marginalized by the society of the dominant species).

This needs the kind of attention that will NOT marginalize or dismiss the atrocity of their even BEING industries of animal exploitation and abuse and will NOT let the definition of the situation drawn tightly around one individual's presumed mental status (a designation made by a relative, not a mental health professional).

"I'm not a big fan of self-sacrifice" in any way, and I've commented often in public spaces to that effect, but some desperation is triggered when society's moral condition reaches such overt depths of depravity that we wear bodies of tortured animals as symbols of status and glamor and pride.

The longstanding issue is NOT the mental status of Daniel Shaull; it's (a) the grave injustice of animal exploitation and abuse AND (b) the moral depravity of a species who, beyond all consequentialist calculations, continues to abuse where there IS no defensible rationale.

This is the year 2010.  Are YOU still eating and wearing dead animals?  [If so, grunt !]  It's time for a profound change in our understanding of our moral relationships with self-aware persons of all kinds, not merely symbolic readjustments or the same-old same-old dismissive marginalizations.
 

Saturday, January 16, 2010

Personalism

I have long thought that personalism is an ideal conceptual or philosophical 'vehicle' for expressing per-personal (and thus pro-animal) sentiments conceptually, abstractly, philosophically.  The later Peter A. Bertocci, a well-known Personalist, taught at Boston University.  He is often cited in papers about complex moral matters, particularly about sex and love, but the moral status of the person in distributed moral obligations is a concern for principled persons of all kinds, including those of us with profound respect for personhood in every species.

Peter Anthony Bertocci
May 13, 1910-October 13, 1989
Borden Parker Bowne Professor of Philosophy, Boston University, where he taught for thirty-one years. B.A., Boston (1931); M.A., Harvard (1932); Ph.D., Boston (1935).  Dissertation: The Empirical Argument for God in Late British Thought (published in 1938 by Boston University Press; advisor: Frederick Robert Tennant - the process metaphysician).

Other books include 
The Human Venture in Sex, Love, and Marriage 
(1949); 
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion 
(1951);
Free Will, Responsibility, and Grace (1957); 
Religion as Creative Insecurity
(1958);
Sex, Love, and the Person (1967); 
The Person God Is 
(1970); and 
The Goodness of God 
(1981)

On This Site:a
Materialism: Failing before Life’s Challenges
In 1951, Bertocci wrote:
“. . . no matter how narrow the gap between the chemical and the living becomes—and discoveries about the nature of viruses and colloids do indeed narrow that gap—we must remember that the gap is a qualitative and not a spatial one.  Suppose we consider the colloids the ‘missing link’ between living and dead matter.  This may impress our minds with the wondrous continuity of degree between one order of being and another.  But let us take a closer look.  Has the gap between life and matter really been crossed, let alone explained?  Even though a colloid may reproduce as living things do, it otherwise behaves like a chemical.  But a cell acts throughout like a living being and not like a chemical.  The fact still remains that when life appeared,life appeared. . . . This collocation of events, this close interrelation of living and nonliving beings, is an opaque fact unless we postulate a purpose which uses one order as an aid to the continuance of another.  Obviously this appeal to a broader purpose will not explain how the food enters the stomach becomes part of the living blood, bone, nerve, and brain.  Any biochemist can give us the sequence, but he is as silent before this fact of transmutation as we are.  However, we’re not trying to introduce a Purposer to describe what science has not so far described; here we seek to explain the harmony between two orders of being, the harmony between two differing and interacting qualities of existence.   We are seeking a view which, far from denying established scientific facts, will allow them to fit into a broader scheme which decreases the mystery.  What mystery?  The fact that living beings should appear and be so closely interconnected with nonliving beings—especially if all there was to begin with was the nonpurposeful, nonliving, nonthinking hustle and bustle of units of energy. . . .”
“. . . Our interest here is to emphasize the greater coherence which comes into our thinking if we consider the interrelation of the physical universe and life and the developing evolution of species as the handiwork of a creative Intelligence intent on producing a world rich in life, and, in the existence of man, rich in mind and value.  The evidence so far adduced enables us to envisage a Mind which is responsible not only for the ultimate physical preparations for life but for the first appearance of life in its many forms and for the additional mutations and variations discovered by our scientists.”
Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 1951, pp. 333-34, 337 (italics in the original).
Fifty years later, the atheist Antony Flew wrote:
“[We may now know] how—by evolution through natural selection—one or more very primitive kinds of organism evolved into the enormous variety of species now known either still to exist or to have existed during some period in the past.  But that is a very different thing from knowing the explanation for the existence and apparently purposeful form of all life or even of any life.  For, so far as I know, no one has as yet contrived to produce any plausible conjecture as to how even the most primitive kind of organism with a disposition to reproduce and thus to expose itself to natural selection might have evolved from a mixture of the many kinds of complex molecule which are now known to be required for that construction.  [My italics; Flew has been dealing with these issues for over fifty years.]
“Conway sees here a threefold challenge to the materialist, of which I consider two of the elements to be much more formidable than the third.  The first of these two is to produce a materialistic explanation for ‘the very first emergence of living matter from non-living matter. In being alive, living matter possesses ateleological organization that is wholly absent from everything that preceded it.’  The second challenge . . . is to produce an equally materialist explanation for the emergence, from the very earliest life-forms which were incapable of reproducing themselves, of life-forms which a capacity for reproducing them-selves.”
Review of David Conway, The Rediscovery of Wisdom, Philosophy, January 2001, p. 161.
Posted October 13, 2007